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Abstract—Both authentication and deauthentication are in-
strumental for preventing unauthorized access to computer and
data assets. While there are obvious motivating factors for
using strong authentication mechanisms, convincing users to
deauthenticate is not straight-forward, since deauthentication
is not considered mandatory. A user who leaves a logged-in
workstation unattended (especially for a short time) is typically
not inconvenienced in any way; in fact, the other way around –
no annoying reauthentication is needed upon return. However, an
unattended workstation is trivially susceptible to the well-known
“lunchtime attack” by any nearby adversary who simply takes
over the departed user’s log-in session. At the same time, since
deathentication does not intrinsically require user secrets, it can,
in principle, be made unobtrusive. To this end, this paper designs
the first automatic user deauthentication system – FADEWICH
– that does not rely on biometric- or behavior-based techniques
(e.g., keystroke dynamics) and does not require users to carry
any devices. It uses physical properties of wireless signals and
the effect of human bodies on their propagation.
To assess FADEWICH’s feasibility and performance, extensive
experiments were conducted with its prototype. Results show
that it suffices to have nine inexpensive wireless sensors deployed
in a shared office setting to correctly deauthenticate all users
within six seconds (90% within four seconds) after they leave
their workstation’s vicinity. We considered two realistic scenarios
where the adversary attempts to subvert FADEWICH and showed
that lunchtime attacks fail.
I. INTRODUCTION
To prevent unauthorized access to various restricted re-
sources, most computer systems mandate authentication and
deauthentication mechanisms. Unfortunately, their efficacy is
weakened since many users are too lazy, too distracted, or
simply annoyed by these security procedures. Users who do
not care about protecting resources (because they do not
understand either their vaue or seriousness of threats) often
attempt to avoid, circumvent or simplify security procedures,
e.g., select easy-to-remember passwords [30] that are also easy
to crack [5].
In most multi-user settings (e.g., home, office, school) most
users tend to, perhaps grudgingly, accept the need for authenti-
cation. Moreover, mandatory system rules can dictate selection
and change criteria, such that trivial passwords are avoided
and new passwords are periodically required. However, since
deauthentication requires no passwords (or any other secrets)
easily annoyed, lazy or absent-minded users can leave their
log-in session unattended, for numerous reasons, e.g., make a
private phone-call, have a coffee, use the restroom or go to
lunch. In this case, any physically nearby adversary can easily
perform a so-called “lunchtime attack” [10], which basically
means: walk up to the unattended computer and gain access
to the current log-in session of the authorized departed user.
A great deal of prior research has been devoted to user au-
thentication, yielding many techniques some of which are both
effective (i.e., unavoidable), and usable, even transparent [1].
Currently, the most popular form of authentication involves
providing traditional account credentials, i.e., username and
password. At the same time, biometric-based techniques (e.g.,
fingerprint, voice, writing, iris, and face recognition) are
gaining popularity both as stand-alone or second-factor means
of authentication.
In contrast, much less attention has been paid to deau-
thentication. In particular, there is no effective (i.e., with low
error rates) user-transparent deauthentication method. To the
best of our knowledge, other than mandatory re-login after a
fixed interval of user-input inactivity, there is no widely used
deauthentication method. Unfortunately, if this interval is too
short, users are annoyed by having to re-authenticate often and
perhaps unnecessarily. Meanwhile, if it is too long, lunchtime
attacks become more likely. In fact, lunchtime attacks are
always possible when inactivity intervals are used: interval
size determines the adversary’s window of opportunity.
Alternatively, explicit deauthentication can be mandated. It
can be made very easy, e.g., just a single mouse click on
a screen-lock icon. However, lazy, careless or distracted users
neglect to follow the rules [23, 24]. Since username/password-
based authentication will remain in wide use for the foresee-
able future [12, 22], automatic deauthentication remains an
open challenge. An ideal deathentication method would be
unobtrusive (user-transparent) and highly effective.
Although lunchtime attacks involve physical constraints
(i.e., the adversary must be physically near the victim), this
is not an excuse to ignore the problem. In fact, insider
attacks are very common and potentially very dangerous. For
example, a 2014 survey of 557 large organizations showed
that over half (53%) experienced an insider-caused security
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incident [7]. Also, average financial loss caused by such an
incident exceeds US$100,000 [26]. Furthermore, as reported
in 2015 by Verizon [31], insider and privilege misuse are
the most frequent types of security incidents among 9 inci-
dent categories. Typically, malicious insiders exploit multiple
opportunities throughout working hours to attempt to gain
unauthorized access. Plus, being usually aware of local system
vulnerabilities, they can act very quickly.
In this paper, we design a new deauthentication method,
called Fast Deauthentication over the Wireless Channel
(FADEWICH), which uses multiple wireless (WiFi) sensors
deployed within an office. These devices communicate through
the wireless radio channel and monitor physical properties of
this channel. For actual deauthentication we take advantage of
the effect that human bodies have on the propagation of high
frequency wireless signals. Specifically, when a person crosses
(or stands in) the path between a transmitter and a receiver, the
body affects wireless signal propagation, such that the receiver
measures the transmitted signal with a different strength, i.e.,
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) changes [33, 32]. A
receiver determines signal strength of a wireless signal emitted
by a transmitter by combining received signal components. In
cluttered indoor environments (e.g., a typical office setting),
signal strength is determined by components that arrive at
the receiver after being scattered, reflected and diffracted by
obstacles, such as walls and objects (multipath propagation). A
person moving near wireless sensors causes signal components
to change, producing fluctuations in measured signal strength,
primarily by breaking the line-of-sight (LoS) condition be-
tween them, and by altering propagation of multipath signal
components [19].
Contributions
This paper’s main contribution is a new deauthentication
method – FADEWICH – suitable for a typical multi-user or
shared office setting, where computers and workstations are
not physically protected, e.g., by doors. In such a setting, a ma-
licious insider can attempt to gain physical access to a work-
station (or computer) that is left logged-in and unattended.
FADEWICH is easy to deploy, user-transparent and does not
require users to have any extra devices. FADEWICHis also
efficient – it deauthenticates a user within a few seconds after
stepping away – and usable, i.e., even idle users who remain
at the workstation are not deauthenticated.
To assess feasibility and efficacy of FADEWICH, we im-
plemented it and evaluated its performance in a realistic
office setting. We designed and ran experiments with fewest
possible assumptions: while users were aware of the system,
they did not interact with it directly. Also, they were asked
not to change their normal behavior, meaning that there are
no limitations on how and how frequently they moved. We
identified two realistic insider lunchtime attack scenarios We
show that, with enough sensors, FADEWICH prevents all such
lunchtime attacks. Moreover, we compare FADEWICH with
simple time-out-based deauthentication and show that loss of
usability in the former is negligible, especially considering
security benefits that it offers.
II. RELATED WORK
We now overview wireless signal strength analysis for lo-
calization purposes (Section II-A), followed by state-of-the-art
authentication and deauthentication techniques (Section II-B).
A. RSSI for localization
Researchers have been using the effect of the human body
on wireless signals for several years. Bahl et al. in their
pioneering RADAR [2], used RSSI processing for localization
purposes. RADAR was among the first works to consider the
obstruction effect of the user body on the signal strengths, and
thus point out the difference of the measured values between
transceivers in LoS and not-LoS condition.
In wireless sensor networks, RSSI processing has been used
for device free localization, where people can be located inside
the monitored environment even if they do no carry a wireless
enabled devices, using the body obstruction effect on the
signals [15]. Kaltiokallio and Bocca [14] used this approach
for intrusion detection. The system in [14], is able to detect
and track the presence of an intruder who is moving inside
the area monitored by wireless sensors. Further improvements
were made, and RSSI processing was combined with Radio
Tomographic Imaging (RTI) in order to track multiple peo-
ple [4, 33]. RTI use a large number of wireless sensors to
tackle the unpredictable nature of the radio environment: the
information from several pairs of sensors is combined in order
to infer the presence and movement of the person.
Although RTI techniques proved to be very effective to
track people locations, these are not applicable in our context.
In fact, in very cluttered and small rooms, the multipath
components resulting from the reflections due to the walls, the
objects, and the physical presence of users, have a fundamental
role in the observed signal strength, producing very noisy and
unpredictable changes [19]. Moreover, RTI is based on an
initial calibration phase, where the system understands the
behavior of the radio environment when there is nobody in it.
Afterwards, the fluctuations caused by the movement of users
result different compared to the learned behavior. In our model
a static and long-term calibration is not possible, since there
is not an unique “steady state”: the environment is dynamic,
users may be walking inside the office, standing still, or sitting
in their chairs.
B. Deauthentication Solutions
Since the deauthentication strongly depends on the authen-
tication scheme, an overview on these authentication mecha-
nisms is necessary. Nowadays, the most popular authentication
scheme is the use of passwords. Using passwords for the
authentication has several advantages: they are very intuitive
and convenient to use, users do not need to perform any
activity (after the log in) nor carry any device. However,
one of their main drawbacks is that there is no way of
automatically deauthenticate users, exposing the user accounts
and the system to possible threats. Security researchers have
thoroughly pointed out the weaknesses of password-based
authentication [5, 22, 6, 12], and they have invested lots of
effort in the search for usable and secure alternatives.
In this direction, a promising field is behavioral biometrics.
Behavioral biometrics are typically passive (or transparent) to
the users, and can be used for continuous authentication. With
continuous authentication techniques, the user is continuously
authenticated as long as he interacts with the system, and he is
deauthenticated once his interactions stop, providing automatic
deauthentication. One of the more popular biometrics in this
category is keystroke dynamics [3]. Even if these biometrics
reached low error rates [11], and are approaching a wider
adoption, their security guarantees remain questionable. In
fact, error rates does not thoroughly represent the security
properties of a biometric system: they only shows the re-
silience against the zero-effort attack (i.e., the success rate
of one malicious user enrolled into the system that claims
another user identity). When the threat model changes, the
error rates could become irrelevant. For example, Meng et
al. [28] have examined the reliability of the keystroke dynam-
ics, and they showed that an adversary is able to reproduce one
user behavior after a brief training (after observing the user
typing on a keyboard). Recently, more sophisticated biometrics
like the ones based on the pulse response [21], or on the
eye movements [10, 25] have been investigated. Although
these solutions are harder to observe and to craft by an
adversary, their deployment requires specific hardware, which
may be considerably expensive, and that hinders their large-
scale adoption.
Another approach to the deauthentication, is to adopt tech-
niques based on proximity. In these techniques, users carry
small tokens that communicate over a short range radio
channel with the workstations, providing continuous authenti-
cation [8, 27]. The workstations periodically poll the tokens
via a secure channel to detect their proximity, and they are
automatically secured as soon as the token is unreachable.
The major drawback of proximity based authentication is that
it requires the user to carry some device (and the system
administrator to deploy and manage them), exposing to serious
threats in case such devices are stolen.
Mare et al. proposed ZEBRA [16], an hybrid approach
for the continuous authentication. In their work, they have
users wear a bracelet with an in-built gyroscope on their
dominant wrist, and they combine the inputs received on the
workstation (i.e., mouse movement and keyboard typing) with
the actions observed by the bracelet. Where the two time series
of events do not correlate, the user is logged out and the
workstation is locked. However, as pointed out by Huhta et
al [13], ZEBRA design is flawed: they showed that 40% of
attackers are able to remain logged in for more than 10 minutes
by opportunistically choosing the time and type of interactions
(bracelet and mouse movement, and keyboard typing). The
authors acknowledge that the system relies on assumptions that
makes it vulnerable to attackers, and even if ZEBRA performs
well against accidental misuse by innocent users, opportunistic
attackers remain a tough challenge.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Our main goal is to automatically deauthenticate users who
are logged into a workstation when they leave its proximity.
The method must be inexpensive and easy to deploy with
minimal (preferably none) hardware requirements. Another
goal is usability which translates into user transparency and
low error rates. An error refers to a false positive, i.e., a
user being mistakenly deauthenticated while still using, and
being physically present at, the workstation, thus forcing a
superfluous log-in ( as discussed in [22], users find repetitive
password entry time-consuming and very annoying). Also, the
system must not invade user privacy, e.g., using a camera is
obtrusive and generates privacy issues that might discomfit
users [18]).
The system model is as follows:
1) The environment is a workplace with k workstations
w1, ..., wk. Users log in using some authentication
mechanism the particulars of which are not important for
deauthentication. Each workstation monitors user input
activity and communicates the idle time to a central
station. We assume that there is a single entrance – the
only way users can access and exit the office.
2) There are m wireless devices d1, ..., dm each capable of
sending packets and monitoring signal strength of packets
received from the others. This lets us obtain m× (m−1)
streams of signal strengths, which are transmitted through
a secure channel (not necessarily a wireless one) to a
central station.
3) At installation time, there is an initial phase when the sys-
tem automatically collects and labels data. No adversarial
presence is assumed during this phase.
A. Threat Model
In the context of this paper, a threat means unauthorized
access to an honest user’s account. We assume that the
adversary is potentially anyone who has physical access to
the office, e.g., co-workers, supervisors, customers, janitors,
and delivery personnel. The adversary’s goal is to gain access
to an active log-in session on the target workstation used
by one victim user. The adversary does not know that user’s
login credentials. We distinguish between two sub-types of
adversaries:
• Insider: anyone with access to the outside of the office.
This can be any employee of the same organization.
However, insider is not supposed to enter the actual office
housing the target workstation.
• Co-worker: anyone with access to the inside of the office
(e.g., a co-worker, assigned to another workstation in
the same office) who is not supposed to use the target
workstation.
Since workstations might be close to each other, co-worker can
access the target faster than insider. If automatic deauthentica-
tion is based on a fixed time-out, co-worker has a significant
advantage.
As for other types of attacks, Section V-C discusses our
reasons for not considering attacks that alter the physical
propagation of wireless signals. We also do not consider social
engineering attacks.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
We now present technical details of FADEWICH and mo-
tivate its design.
A. Overview
The complete system includes several components and
three main modules: Keyboard/Mouse Activity module (KMA,
described in Section IV-B), Movement Detection module (MD,
described in Section IV-C), and Radio Environment module
(RE, described in Section IV-D). These modules can access
information provided by sensors and workstations, and a
classifier that has been previously trained (see Section IV-D3).
Another component implements the control part of the system,
which merges information provided by the modules to apply
actions to the workstations. Section IV-E discusses the over-
lapping movements problem, while Section IV-F illustrates
system actions and the workflow of FADEWICH.
KMAREMD
...
control
SYSTEM
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classifier
workstation
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Fig. 1: Overview of FADEWICH components.
B. Keyboard/Mouse Activity (KMA)
This module monitors user input at each workstation,
and keeps track of idle time, i.e., the interval of time the
workstation observed no keyboard or mouse input. When
the system at time t asks KMA which workstations have
been idle for s seconds, KMA returns a set of workstations
S
(s)
t = {wh, ..., wj} that have been idle between t− s and t.
C. Movement Detection (MD)
This module obtains signal strength streams and determines
whether there has been any significant fluctuations in the radio
environment. In the following, after introducing the notation,
we show how such fluctuations are identified based on the
discrepancy with a learned level of fluctuations.
1) Notation: We refer to signal strength measurement on
stream i at time t as: r(i)t . A window on a stream is a sequence
of measurements, such that, for a given size d, and time t:
V
(i)
t−d,t = {r(i)t−d, r(i)t−d+1, ..., r(i)t }.
Given a distribution r = {r1, r2, ..., rn}, and a kernel function
K, we refer to its estimated density function as:
fˆK(r) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K(
r − ri
h
),
where h is the bandwidth of the kernel.
2) Standard Deviation Profile: To recognize users’ move-
ments, we decided to use the sum of the standard deviations
of signal streams. Initially, MD builds a distribution of these
summations, using a sliding window to compute standard
deviations of some period of data, e.g., 30 seconds in our
experiments. At each time step t, the summation of standard
deviations st is computed as:
st =
∑
i
σ
V
(i)
t−d,t
,
where σ
V
(i)
t−d,t
is the standard deviation of measurements
in window V (i)t−d,t, d is window size, and i identifies the
stream. These values form a frequency distribution s =
{s0, s1, ..., sn}, that we refer to as the normal profile. Density
of distribution s is estimated with a Gaussian kernel and the
estimated function sˆ is later used for comparison.
Thereafter, MD periodically computes the current sum of
standard deviations st with the latest observed data. When st
exceeds the (100− α)th percentile of cumulative distribution
function Sˆ of estimated distribution sˆ, the module reports
the anomalous changes observed. When changes belong to
the remaining part of the distribution, MD reports the normal
state. Figure 2 shows the difference between the measurements
of st when no one is walking in the office, and when a
user is walking inside. The solid line shows the probability
distribution function estimated with the Gaussian kernel.
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Fig. 2: Frequency distribution of observed total standard
deviation.
3) Profile Update: Due to the noisy nature of the radio
environment, behavior of the streams varies slightly depending
on several factors, in particular, the number of users in the
room. To account for this phenomena, the normal profile needs
to be updated with most recent measurements. We use batches
of size b for the update: each time current st is computed,
it is queued for the update. When the queue reaches size b,
Algorithm 1 MD workflow
1: sˆ← initialize normal profile()
2: Q← {} // batch for profile update
3: while True do
4: st ←∑
i
σ
V
(i)
t−d,t
5: ub← Sˆ(100−α)th
6: Q← Q+ {st}
7: if st ≥ ub then
8: return anomalous
9: else
10: if |Q| ≥ b then
11: if not is anomalous(Q, τ ) then
12: sˆ← update distribution(sˆ, Q)
13: else
14: Q← {}
15: end if
16: end if
17: return normal
18: end if
19: end while
if less than a fraction τ of values in the queue belonged to
(100 − α)th percentile of Sˆ, they are added to the normal
profile distribution by removing the oldest b values. The kernel
density estimation is performed again after each update.
Algorithm 1 shows MD workflow. Whenever MD returns
anomalous, the current state of the environment significantly
differs from the learned profile. Whereas, if it returns normal,
the current state matches the profile.
4) Variation Windows: Hereafter, we refer to variation
windows as time intervals [t1, t2], where MD has recognized
anomalous fluctuations that started at time t1 and continued
until t2, when the the environment went back to normal.
Unfortunately, user movements are not the only cause of
fluctuations. The radio environment is subject to other un-
controlled changes that may result in variation windows even
if no one is moving. To account for this possibility and to
exclude other brief variations due to users moving slightly
while remaining at their workstations, there is a threshold on
the duration of variations windows t∆. This way, variation
windows shorter that t∆ are ignored, while longer windows are
interpreted as user movements and trigger a system decision.
The value of t∆ must be chosen very carefully, since it bears
much impact on overall performance; see Section VII-A.
D. Radio Environment (RE)
The radio environment module reads the signal strength
streams, and matches the observed signal changes to a specific
workstation. A user who steps away from the workstation al-
ters signal propagation of wireless sensors, based on trajectory
of movement. These signal alterations form a recognizable
pattern and we use a classifier to identify them. We now
describe how training samples are built and labeled, as well
as how the system is trained.
1) Samples: Each sample represents a signature of the
effect on the radio environment of a user who after sitting
at a workstation leaves the proximity of that workstation.
To obtain a sample, we need to identify the correct interval
where the user leaves the proximity of the workstation. We use
the timings provided by the variation windows measured by
MD module, assuming that movement is always obtained with
a variation window [t1, t2]. When such a window is observed,
for each stream i, we extract signal strengths observed in
window:
V
(i)
t1,t1+t∆ = {r
(i)
t1 , r
(i)
t1+1
..., r
(i)
t1+t∆}
of size |V (i)t1,t1+t∆ | = n, and we compute the following
features:
• Variance of the window:
σ2 =
∑
j
(rj − µ)2
n
.
• Entropy of the frequency distribution histogram V of the
window:
H = −
∑
rj∈V
P (rj) logP (rj).
• Autocorrelation of the window:
R(k) =
1
(n− k)σ2
n−k∑
j=t1
(rj − µ)(rj+k − µ).
We use the window from [t1, t1+t∆] instead of the full [t1, t2]
because the most distinctive part of the user’s physical position
when leaving the workstation occurs at the beginning. Some
portions of the user’s path out of the office are likely to overlap
with paths of other users (since there is a single door, users
likely move towards it). Meanwhile, initial segments of users’
paths are naturally less likely to overlap.
2) Labels: We use a set of labels w0, w1, ..., wk for samples
associated with specific events. w0 is associated with the event:
“user entered the office” and each other wi is associated with
the event: “user left workstation wi”. w0 is needed since users
entering the office generate significant fluctuations in the radio
environment: this must be detected so as not to mistakenly
deauthenticate users who are still at their workstations.
3) Training Phase: During the training phase, FADEWICH
runs the MD module to detect variation windows. For every
variation window, FADEWICH extracts the corresponding
sample, computing its features. Afterwards, the system uses
KMA to fetch idle time for the workstations, and tries to
automatically label the sample. The time of a user’s departure
from the workstation and idle time at that workstation are
correlated, since from the moment the user walks away the
workstation observes no further input, until the user returns. To
avoid erroneous labeling, when FADEWICH is uncertain (i.e.,
more than one workstation is idle during the variation window)
it simply discards the sample. At the end of the training phase,
labeled samples are used to set up a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier used in the online phase.
4) Online Phase: In this phase, whenever MD observes a
variation window W = [t1, t2] of size ≥ t∆, at time t1 + t∆
(before the end of the window) the system queries RE. The
module fetches the window of signal strength measurements
V
(i)
t1,t1+t∆ ,∀ i, computes the features for the windows to
construct the sample, inputs the sample into the classifier and
returns the predicted label.
E. Overlaps
FADEWICH does not recognize situations when multiple
users walk away from their workstation at the same time, or
their movement intervals overlap. RE is trained with samples
that correspond to events where, from an initial state when
no one is moving away, a single user leaves the workstation.
Figure 3 shows an example where the movement of one user
interferes with other users signatures and vice-versa. Two users
at wi and wj walk away and MD observes a single variation
window [t1, t4]; note that both users are moving inside the
room in the interval [t2, t3]. We refer to this situation as
overlap. Whenever it happens, signatures in the radio envi-
ronment are unreliable, since multiple bodies in motion alter
radio signals in different physical locations. Moreover, since
MD only detects discrepancies from a normal fluctuations
profile, FADEWICH can not detect whether multiple users
are moving.
To tackle this issue, FADEWICH errs on the conservative
side: as long as MD observes the continuation of the variation
window after t1+t∆, FADEWICH accounts for the possibility
of other users possibly leaving and triggers activity responses
at the workstations based on their idle time. The next section
details activity responses and their trigger events.
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Fig. 3: Sample overlap timeline.
F. System Actions and Rules
To introduce the final system flow, we identify the types of
actions FADEWICH can impose on the workstations:
• Deauthenticate: current login session on wi is deauthen-
ticated, and requires re-authentication.
• Alert State: in this state, if wi remains idle for at
least tID seconds, the system activates a screen saver.
However, if any keyboard or mouse activity is observed,
wi exits alert state and current session remains authenti-
cated. The duration of alert state is only few seconds, as
discussed in Section VII.
Table I shows the rules that FADEWICH uses to determine the
appropriate action. Columns RE and KMA show the outputs
from the modules, while column Action describes the type of
action.
Rule RE KMA Action
1 ci S(t∆) if ci /∈ S(t∆) then Deauthenticate ci
2 - S(1) ∀ ci ∈ S(1) Alert State ci
TABLE I: Rules used to determine the action.
G. System Workflow
The system works as a finite state automaton with two
states; in each discrete time step it queries MD, and, depending
on its output, moves between the states. State transitions are
defined based on the duration of the current variation window
reported by MD. At time t we refer to Wt = [ti, t] as the
most recent variation window, lasting from ti until t. If such
a variation window does not exist, we assume that t− ti = 0.
Let dWt = t− ti be the size of this window.
Figure 4 shows the state diagram. Two states: Quiet and
Noisy allow FADEWICH to react depending on the conditions
of the radio environment. Noisy deals with overlaps mentioned
in Section IV-E, while Quiet handles normal cases when users
leave their workstations one at a time. The system remains
in Quiet, until MD observes variations window of less than
t∆, i.e., dWt < t∆. As soon as the current variation window
reaches t∆ (i.e., dWt = t∆), the system queries RE and KMA,
and applies Rule 1. Next, state transitions to Noisy. While in it,
until the current variation window continues (i.e., dWt > t∆),
at each time step the system queries KMA and applies Rule
2. When MD reports that the variation window is over (i.e.,
dWt = 0), FADEWICH transitions back to Quiet and repeats
the cycle.
Quiet Noisy
dWt≥tΔ
Rule 1 Rule 2
dWt<tΔ dWt=0
dWt≥tΔ
Fig. 4: FADEWICH state diagram.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now analyze security issues, focusing on poten-
tial attacks. Section V-A discusses possible outcomes and
Section V-B considers their security implications.
A. Terminology
We first categorize decisions by MD and RE. For MD, when
the user leaves the workstation at time t, we consider the
interval where a movement should be observed by MD. We
refer to it as the true window: Ut = [t − δ, t + δ]. Given
all true windows {Uti , ..., Utj}, and all variation windows
{Wth , ...,Wtk} observed by MD, we classify MD decisions
as:
• True Positive (TP): Wth and Uti overlap – correctly
identified movement.
• False Positive (FP): Wth does not overlap with any Uti
– incorrectly identified movement.
• False Negative (FN): Uti does not overlap with any Wth
– failure to identify movement.
For RE, we only consider true positives. False positives do
not represent an attack opportunity since no workstation is
left unattended (they affect usability), while false negatives
imply that MD did not observe the variation window; there-
fore FADEWICH does not interrogate RE, as discussed in
Section IV-G. When a user leaves wi leaves and a true
positive occurs, FADEWICH queries RE to classify the sample
corresponding to the observed variation window. There are two
possible outcomes:
• Correct: RE outputs wi,
• Mis-classified: RE outputs wh 6= wi.
As a baseline, we assume that the workstation has a normal
deauthentication time-out, i.e., whenever it is idle for T
seconds, the current session is terminated. We also assume
that last input of a user departing at time t occurs at exactly
that time. This is a worst-case assumption: if last input occurrs
earlier, deauthentication takes place sooner. In the next section
we fuse these considerations to obtain a comprehensive model
for security analysis.
B. Security Modeling
We use decision tree analysis to create a tree that represents
all possible outcomes when a user leaves the workstation.
Figure 5 is a representation of the tree; its leaves contain the
times when deauthentication occurs, for each case. It shows
that true positives, depending on RE outcome, may result in
deauthentication at time t1 + t∆ when the classification is
correct (case A), or deauthentication at time t+tID+tss when
the sample is misclassified (case B). False negatives result in
deauthentication by time-out at time t+ T (case C).
User using wi leaves the
proximity of wi at t,
its true window is Uj=[t-δ,t+δ]
MD perceives a variation window
Wk=[t1,t2] that overlaps with Uj?
no (FALSE NEGATIVE)(TRUE POSITIVE) yes
RE correctly classifies 
the sample corresponding 
to Wk as wi?
(CORRECT) yes no (MISCLASSIFIED)
t1+tΔ
t+tID+tss
t+T
case A case B
case C
Fig. 5: Decision tree showing deauthentication timings.
C. Wireless Physical Attacks
One intuitive way to attack FADEWICH is by jamming,
which alters wireless signal propagation and RSSI. Feasibility
of attacks that manipulate wireless signals in real-time has
been demonstrated in real-world scenarios: signal can be either
annihilated entirely, or its content can be modified [20]. In
scenarios where RSSI integrity is critical (such as WLAN-
based positioning systems), jamming attacks can seriously
compromise the outcomes [29].
In our case, we believe that the adversary can not jam
the wireless signal to alter RSSI. To prevent correct oper-
ation of FADEWICH, the adversary must alter all wireless
transmission among devices such that standard deviations of
signal streams do not increase when a users steps away from
the workstation. To do so, the adversary must determine the
current RSSI of a stream and alter it to make sure that new
RSSI measurement matches the previous ones. Since RSSI
strongly depends on locations of communicating device and
impact of physical obstacles (i.e., users and other objects in
the room), we believe that the adversary can not alter signal
strength obtained by specific sensors at specific times, i.e.,
when the moving user alters signal strengths between specific
sensors.
Even if such alterations were achievable, due to close
relative proximity of devices, it is very hard to limit alteration
only to certain devices, i.e, the alteration of one transmission
originating from device di is measured by all the other devices.
Therefore, such attacks are detectable. Thus, we believe that
such physical attacks are ineffective against FADEWICH.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this section we discuss design choices for the experi-
ments.
A. Design Choices
The goal of the experiments is to show that FADEWICH is
both secure and usable. To assess security, we use the time
required for deauthentication, as described in Section V-B.
This is reasonable in our model, where the adversary can can
physically access an unattended workstation with an active
(authenticated) login session. To measure this time, it is
sufficient to measure frequencies of occurrence for each leaf
in the decision tree of Figure 5. We record the timing when the
user exits the office. This allows for realistic measurements of
the impact of two adversary types (Insider and Co-worker), in
terms of number of their opportunities to attack without being
witnessed.
For the usability aspect, we account for the fact that the
system may incorrectly activate a screen saver or perform
deauthentication, when the user is still present at the work-
station. In such cases, the user needs react by either canceling
the screen saver or re-authenticating. This extra effort (cost)
can be viewed as a fixed delay. Screen saver cancellation and
deauthentication involve different costs, since the the former
only requires the user to generate some input, while the latter
involves re-authentication, i.e., a new log-in.
To evaluate FADEWICH’s performance in a general setting
we need to make as few assumptions as possible. To account
for differences in keyboard typing or mouse movement habits
among users, we simulate the keyboard and mouse input on the
workstations. This is because many system decisions depend
on idle time observed at the workstations, and we want to
avoid non-representative behavior of our subjects compromise
the evaluation.
B. Experiment Structure
We conducted experiments in one of our offices, that adheres
to our system model assumptions. The office contains three
workstations and three distinct users (students), each assigned
to exactly one workstation. We placed nine wireless sensors
along the office walls, about one meter from the ground;
slightly above the average desk height. Figure 6 shows the
layout of the office as well as sensor and workstation locations.
Users were not required to perform any extra tasks during
the experiments, in order to emulate their everyday routine. A
human supervisor monitored actual timings of user movements
by noting the times when users stepped away from their
workstations, as well as the times when they entered and
exited the room. We collected signal strengths observed by
the sensors for five consecutive days, during working hours
(9am-5pm), for a total of 40 hours. At the end, we obtained
130 labeled events, summarized in Table II. We did not register
any overlap in the collected data; see Section IV-E.
label w0 w1 w2 w3
number of events 67 21 20 22
TABLE II: Number of labeled events obtained during data
collection.
w1w2
w3
3 
m
6 m
d1
d2 d3 d4 d5
d6
d7d8d9
Fig. 6: Layout of the office where experiments were per-
formed.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now present experimental results and analyze
FADEWICHperformance improvement when the number of
sensors is increased.
A. MD performance
We measure MD performance in terms of TP, FP, and
FN. Figure 7 shows the F-measure for MD computed as
2 · precision·recallprecision+recall , for increasing sizes of parameter t∆, and
for different number of sensors. The F-measure shows the
trade-off between the number of variation windows correctly
identified as TP, and the number (out of the 130 events) of
correctly identified events, by variation windows. Figure 7
shows that there is an F-measure peak around t∆ = 5.0. This
is expected, since in the experiment room the average time
needed by a user to walk from the workstation to the door is
about 5 seconds (4-meter distance, assuming walking speed
of 1.4 m/sec, plus time required to stand up and later open
the door). Recall is more important than precision, because
for each FN case C happens (see Figure 5). Therefore, we
err on the side of caution and use t∆ = 4.5; hereafter, all
results refer to this value., unless otherwise specified. Table III
shows percentages of obtained TP, FP and FN for various
numbers of sensors for t∆ = 4.5. The table shows a promising
result: increasing the number of sensors becomes quickly
conservative against FN, recording zero of them with 8 or
more sensors.
n. of sensors TP (#) FP (#) FN (#)
3 0.47 (62) 0.02 (3) 0.51 (68)
4 0.77 (106) 0.05 (7) 0.18 (24)
5 0.86 (119) 0.06 (8) 0.08 (11)
6 0.88 (122) 0.06 (8) 0.06 (8)
7 0.91 (125) 0.05 (7) 0.04 (5)
8 0.96 (130) 0.04 (6) 0.00 (0)
9 0.95 (130) 0.05 (7) 0.00 (0)
TABLE III: MD performance in percentage in terms of true
positives, false positives and false negatives data.
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Fig. 7: F-measure for MD, for varying values of t∆.
B. RE performance
We measure the performance of RE in terms of the accuracy
of the classification of the variation windows that correspond
to a TP. In order to measure it, we split the collected data into
training and test set in a 5-fold validation. For each fold, we
train the classifier with increasing number of samples in the of
training set, and compute the accuracy on the test set for each
size. Since we have a relatively small number of samples, we
repeat the process 10 times to account for the differences in the
cross validation random split. Figure 8 shows the accuracy of
the classification for an increasing number of training samples,
averaged over the 5 fold of the validation. The error bars show
the 95% confidence interval on the 10 different splits for the
cross validation. Since considering fewer sensors some events
have resulted in a smaller number of TP (see Table III), some
of the lines end early on the x-axis. Figure 8 shows that a
classifier is able to learn quickly how to discriminate between
different workstations. In fact, for 7 or more sensors, after only
40 samples (that correspond roughly to 2 days of training),
RE reaches an accuracy greater than 90%. The figure also
shows that the more sensors are available and the steeper is
the learning curve, and the more accurate the classification
becomes.
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Fig. 8: Accuracy of the classification for RE, for an increasing
number of samples in the training set.
C. Security
As mentioned in Section VI-A, our performance indicator
for the security is the time required for the deauthentication
of the workstation after a user left its proximity. To measure
this time, and hereafter in this section, we run the system on
our data as follows: first we run MD on the whole monitored
period, and obtain its TP, FP, and FN, then we split the
obtained samples into a 5-fold validation. For each fold, we
train RE with the TP in the training set, and for each TP in
the test set we classify it with RE. Given the output of RE and
MD, we check in which of the cases illustrated in Figure 5
we end up. For each case, we compute the time required for
the deauthentication accordingly.
Figure 9 shows the proportion of deauthenticated worksta-
tions for increasing time elapsed after the user left, for t∆ =
4.5, tID = 5 and tss = 3. As shown in the plot, increasing
the number of sensors leads to a faster deauthentication, and
a greater number of events that are captured by MD (case A
and case B). There is a step in the curves exactly at 8 seconds,
this shows the amount of events that have been misclassified
by RE, resulting in case B, where the deauthentication occurs
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Fig. 9: Proportion of deauthenticated workstations.
always after tID + tss = 8 (as shown in Section IV-F) from
the last user input. The occurrence of case C leads to some
workstations not being deauthenticated after 10 seconds, these
workstations are deauthenticated after the expiration of the
baseline time-out T .
Figure 10 shows the number of opportunities that adver-
saries have to access the target workstation without being wit-
nessed by the victim, for Insider and Co-worker, respectively.
For Insider we consider that he can reach the workstation
after 4 seconds since the victim left the office (this a realistic
estimate of the time required to walk to the workstation from
outside the office). For Co-worker, we consider that he can
reach the workstation as soon as the victim user left the office.
We consider that every time a user leaves his workstation
unattended, an attack is possible. As shown in the plot, with
an approach with time-out, both adversaries can perform an
attack every time a user leaves the office (63 times in our
experiment). Increasing the number of sensors, the attack
opportunities significantly decrease, down to zero for 8 or
more sensors.
D. Usability
To simulate the keyboard and mouse input at the worksta-
tions, we refer to the work of Mikkelsen et al [17], where
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Fig. 10: Percentage of times adversaries can perform an attack
on a target workstation, for an increasing number of sensors.
they monitored the keyboard and mouse usage of a sample of
1211 office workplace users. In their analysis, they discretized
time in 5 seconds intervals, and found that, on average, users
are using the keyboard or the mouse during 78% of these
intervals. We refer to their findings, and we simulate the user
inputs in each 5 seconds intervals, such that users have a 78%
probability of using the mouse or keyboard during an interval.
We assign a cost (as defined in Section VI-A) of 3 seconds
for deactivating a screen saver (some users just remove it
before its expiration), and a cost of 13 seconds to re-perform
the authentication (this is on average the time users need
to correctly input their login information [22]). Moreover,
we assume that when a user leaves the proximity of his
workstation, all the other users are inside the room and they are
using their own workstation (this is a worst case assumption,
since some of them might not be in the office and therefore
not be impacted by the system decisions).
For the simulation we follow the procedure described in
Section VII-C, plus we randomly draw the users keyboard and
mouse input distribution over the monitored period. Since the
outcome of the system is dependent on the user inputs, we
draw this distribution for 100 times to account for possible
differences, and average the result.
Table IV shows the total cost for different number of sen-
sors, computed by multiplying the average number of screen
savers and deauthentications for their respective cost (i.e, 3 and
13 seconds, respectively). Values between parenthesis show
the standard deviation over the 100 runs of the simulation.
The results show that while the number of deauthentication
decreases with more sensors, due to the improved precision
of RE, the number of screen savers does not decrease. This
happens because with more sensors we have an higher recall
for MD, and therefore the system needs to deal with an
increased number of variation windows, and activates more
screen savers. However, Table IV shows that the total cost
each day is never higher than 37 seconds. This means that on
average, one user (we have three users in total) is required to
invest ∼13 seconds each day to collaborate with the system,
which is a very acceptable time.
n. of
sensors
# screen savers
per day
# deauthentication
per day
cost (seconds)
per day
3 4.272 (0.82) 0.712 (0.36) 22.07
4 8.238 (1.02) 0.926 (0.43) 36.75
5 8.336 (1.09) 0.754 (0.38) 34.81
6 8.414 (1.17) 0.558 (0.29) 32.5
7 8.188 (1.03) 0.136 (0.15) 26.33
8 8.956 (1.22) 0.086 (0.12) 27.99
9 9.094 (1.15) 0.036 (0.09) 27.75
TABLE IV: Number of times the system takes an incorrect
decision, and total cost in seconds, for a 8h period.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Current research on authentication mechanism focuses more
on the authentication part, and does not thoroughly take into
account the importance of the deauthentication procedure.
Even if authentication solutions that provide automatic deau-
thentication exist, they have limitations: they require the user
to carry additional devices, they lack realistic threat models,
or they require expensive hardware. In this work, we proposed
a solution for the deauthentication – FADEWICH – that
leverages physical properties of wireless signal propagation,
in order to secure unattended workstations in the office work-
place. FADEWICH uses the information provided by wireless
sensors placed inside the office to learn the behavior of the
radio environment, and deauthenticate users when they leave
the vicinity of their workstations. In order to evaluate the
security and usability of our system, we designed an experi-
ment with very few assumptions, and we carried it out in one
office. We showed that, even in a small office where the radio
environment is dynamic and busy, our system grants good
performance. In particular, when the sensors grant a sufficient
coverage of the area inside the office, the system becomes
very accurate and fast in the deauthentication (adversaries
cannot exploit any opportunity to perform an attack), without
disregarding the usability.
A. Discussion and Future Work
The research question behind this paper, was to understand
if it was possible to detect and learn the changes in the wireless
propagation caused by the movement of users. However, char-
acterizing the behavior of wireless signals in such dynamic,
small and cluttered environments has proved to be challenging.
Even if the physical phenomena that regulate the propagation
of radio signals are known, we could not use them directly
to model the environment in our case. In order to obtain an
effective system, we had to rely on high level observations on
the monitored signal strengths, use machine learning for the
classification, and combine these information with the user
inputs at the workstation. Even if this is a poor modeling
of the movement of users, we realized that in a system with
such weak and loose assumptions (e.g., busy wireless channel,
multiple users offices, cheap wireless sensors with simple
hardware), our results are noteworthy.
In the future, in order to prove that the system can be
effective in different environments, we plan to investigate the
performance of the system in different setups (other offices,
with different dimensions and users). We also want to evaluate
its performance considering different placements of the sen-
sors, to understand if the wireless devices currently present in
a common office (e.g., desktop computers, Internet of Things
devices) are sufficient to obtain valuable results. Furthermore,
we also want to explore whether more fine grained information
that can be provided by the wireless channel (such as channel
state information) can improve the system performance.
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APPENDIX
A. Feature Analysis
To understand the role of the features of the samples for RE,
we study the correlations between them, and their importance
in the classification, using all of the nine sensors. Figure 11
shows the correlation between the variances of all the streams,
computed over the labeled samples (for brevity, we did not
include the entropies and the autocorrelations). In the figure,
the label di−dj identifies the variance of the stream that goes
from device i to device j. As shown, when the devices are
close to each other, their variance reacts in similar ways to
the alteration caused by the user who is moving.
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Fig. 11: Correlations between the variances of streams in the
collected samples.
In order to measure the importance of the features, we
remove highly correlated and uncorrelated features, and we
compute their relative mutual information (RMI) with the
class [9]. RMI is a measure of how good the feature is
for discriminating between samples that belong to different
classes. For a feature whose distribution is x, RMI is computed
as the percentage difference between the marginal entropy
of the feature distribution H(x) and its conditional entropy
given the class label H(x|y), with respect to the initial entropy
H(x), that is:
RMI(x, y) =
H(x)−H(x|y)
H(x)
.
For the quantization, we use 256 linearly distributed bins
among the minimum and the maximum of the distribution.
With the RMI values, we plot an heatmap of the importances
of the single streams between devices, reported in Figure 12.
In the figure, darker areas correspond to stronger importance
for the features of the streams that pass through that area, in
terms of RMI. As shown, certain devices (e.g., d5) do not
significantly contribute to the classification, as the their infor-
mation is either not discriminative, or is strongly correlated
with other devices (and is therefore not colored in Figure 12).
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Fig. 12: Importance of the streams in terms of RMI visualized
as an heatmap on the planimetry of the office used for the
experiment.
In Table V, we report the 15 features that scored higher in
terms of RMI in our data in. The feature names indicate the
stream, and the type of feature for that stream, either entropy
(ent), variance (var), or autocorrelation (ac).
Rank feature RMI
1 d9-d2-ent 0.2977
2 d7-d8-ac 0.2863
3 d7-d1-ent 0.2858
4 d1-d3-ac 0.2809
5 d4-d2-ac 0.2807
6 d3-d5-ac 0.2778
7 d6-d8-ac 0.2776
8 d3-d9-ac 0.2770
9 d6-d2-ac 0.2765
10 d4-d1-ac 0.2761
11 d2-d3-ac 0.2757
12 d1-d9-ac 0.2752
13 d1-d6-var 0.2711
14 d8-d9-ac 0.2707
15 d8-d4-ac 0.2698
TABLE V: RMI for the top 15 ranking features.
B. Comparison
In order to evaluate the usability and security aspects side
by side, we introduce a broader indicator for the security,
that is the amount of time workstations spend in a vulner-
able state (i.e., unattended and authenticated). In fact, in our
approach, we are reducing the time that workstations spend
in a vulnerable state, while increasing the cost for the users.
Figure 13 shows such a trade-off, comparing the time-out
approach (with T = 300 seconds time-out) with the outcome
of the system with increasing number of sensors. As shown
in the figure, with a time-out approach there is no cost for
the users, meanwhile, increasing the number of sensors, the
cost increases as well (system is querying users and possibly
committing errors in the deauthentication). However, although
the cost for the users initially increases, it stabilizes soon for an
increasing number of sensors (after four sensors in our exper-
iment). Furthermore, the increment in cost is compensated by
an exponential decrement in the vulnerable time. This means
that increasing the number of sensors does not add significant
burden for the users, while it brings valuable improvements in
terms of security.
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Fig. 13: Comparison between the vulnerable time for the
workstations and the total cost for the users, for an approach
with time-out, and increasing number of sensors.
